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RECENT DECISIONS

TAXATION OPTIONAL VALUATION DATE UNDER FEDERAL ESTATE
TAX - INCLUSION OF INCOME RECEIVED DURING YEAR AFTER DECEDENTS
DEATH IN THE VALUATION OF THE GROSS EsTATE - The executors of three
different estates elected the optional valuation date provided in the federal
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estate tax 1 and were compelled, because of a Treasury regulation,2 to include
rents, interest, and regular dividend payments received during the year after
the decedent's death in their valuation of the gross estate. In actions to recover
overpayment of the tax, the regulation was upheld by the lower federal courts,
and the cases were brought to the Supreme Court by certiorari. Held, regular
dividend, interest, and rent payments received by the estate between the decedent's death and the optional valuation date one year later, should not be included in the gross estate. Maass 'IJ. Higgins, .dhendroth's Estate 'IJ. Commissioner, Blacque's Estate 'IJ. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 443, 61 S. Ct. 631 (1941).
The purpose of Congress in permitting the optional valuation date was to
mitigate the hardships experienced by estates which shrink in value between the
time of the decedent's death and the time when the property of the estate can
be sold to pay the federal estate tax.8 Article 1 I of Treasury Regulations 80
declared that if the optional date of valuation were selected, any interest, dividends, or rents received by the estate during this year should be valued as part
of the gross estate upon which the tax would be levied. This regulation
received varying treatment from different lower federal courts 4 and was
generally regarded as an unwarranted extension of the language of the estate
tax law. 5 Since Congress provided only one method of valuation of the gross
estate, total value of the estate plus interest accrued at the date of death; and
since the report of the House managers contained an example of how the estate
would be calculated a year after the death and referred to depreciation and
1

53 Stat. L. 122 (1939), 26 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § SII (j).
TREAS. REG. So, art. II (1937).
3
"This provision is equitable in its effects and will prevent in practically all
cases the danger of complete confiscation of estates due to a sudden decline in market
values." S. REP. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), p. 9.
4
The Treasury regulation was upheld in Saks v. Higgins, (D. C. N. Y. 1939)
29 F. Supp. 996, affd. (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 1 II F. (2d) 78. By a substitution of parties
on appeal this became Maass v. Higgins. In the other two cases decided by the principal decision the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals, 41 B. T. A. II78 (1940),
were affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) II4 F. (2d) 1017.
In Clark v. United States, (D. C. Md. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 216 at 221, the court
said that because the regulation "ignores the real nature of income, which is something
arising and severed from the principal, and not a growth or an increment of value in
the principal," citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 at 207, 40 S. Ct. i89
(1920), and other cases, and because income arising after the death of the decedent
is property of the successors, the interpretation of the Treasury could not be accepted,
since this estate tax was in the nature of an excise tax on transmission of property of
the decedent to his heirs or distributees.
5 In Johnson, "Federal Estate Tax on Income Accruing after Death," 18 CHICAGO-KENT L. REv. 150 at 163 (1940), the author says that article II of Treasury
Regulations So was really a tax on income accruing to the estate after death rather than
a tax based on the valuation of the income-producing factor of the property existing at
the decedent's death and for this reason should not be upheld. Also see the excellent
article by Hughes, "Validity of Estate Tax Regulations So," 17 TAXES 145 (1939);
Blattmoehr, ''Valuation of Estates under Section 302 (j) of the Federal Estate Tax
law," 34 PA. B. A. Q. 100 at 105 (1938); MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON
ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS, 1938-1939, P· 230.
2
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appreciation of securities and real estate but did not include income received during the year following the decedent's death,6 the Supreme Court decided that
Congress did not intend to include such interim income when the optional valuation date was chosen. 7 The tax is on transfer of property in the estate of the decedent at his death, 8 and to regard the right to receive income as being a separate
property right stretches the usual conception of this term. 9 Hence it seems that the
decision of the Court in the principal case is the logical interpretation of the wording of the statute. Since only ordinary dividends and rent payments were
received by the estate in the principal case, the question whether so-called liquidating dividends would be added to the gross estate at the end of the year is not
presented, but since such dividends do result in reduction of the property rights of
the estate it would seem that they should be added.10 The Court has repeatedly
said that it would not presume that double taxation was intended by Congress
unless such intention is clearly expressed in the statute,11 and this same reluctance
6

H. REP. 1885, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), pp. IO-II.
Principal case, 312 U. S. at 448-449.
8
The theory of the Treasury regulation is that such property as bonds or stocks
consists of two promises, one to pay principal and one to pay interest or dividends;
it regards each of these promises as being part of the gross estate on the date of the
decedent's death so that payment of interest or dividends during the year following
death of decedent can be regarded as a partial disposition of part of property in the estate
on the date of the decedent's death and thus should be added in valuing the gross
estate. Although this is a possible analysis of what "property'' includes, it is not the
usual conception and is particularly objectionable in the case of dividends since, as is
said in I I FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., 786 (1932), "Prior to
the declaration of a dividend the right of the stockholder to a share of the earnings is
not property.•••" To the effect that a right to receive income from the estate was not
property belonging to the estate on the date of the decedent's death, see Bull v. United
States, 295 U. S. 247, 55 S. Ct. 695 (1935).
9
Clark v. United States, (D. C. Md. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 216; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 at 207, 40· S. Ct. 189 (1920); Helvering v. Bruun, 309
U.S. 461, 60 S. Ct. 631 (1940).
10 Dividends which were distributions of part of the capital of the corporation
would reduce the property in the estate on the decedent's death and would therefore
be added to the valuation of the gross estate. Because of the difficulty of ascertaining
when a dividend is being paid out of capital rather than current earnings, this may
present a difficult problem to the courts. Interest or rent payments which are paid in
advance for periods beyond the optional valuation date should also be added if they
reduce the value of the gross estate. See C. C. H., FEDERAL INHERITANCE, ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX SERVICE, 7th ed., § 3378 (1941).
11
Though the Court does not feel that such double taxation would be unconstitutional, they are unwilling to presume that Congress so intended unless the words
of the statute clearly indicate that this result was desired. United States v. SuppleeBiddle Hardware Co., 265 U. S. 189, 44 S. Ct. 546 (1923); Bull v. United States,
295 U. S. 247, 55 S. Ct. 695 (1935). Article I I seems highly inconsistent with the
policy of avoiding double taxation when regarded along with article 37 of the same
regulations: "Taxes upon income received during the decedent's lifetime are deductible,
including interest accrued thereon at time of death, but taxes upon income received
after death are not deductible." See also Hughes, "Validity of Estate Tax Regulations
80," 17 TAXES 145 (1939).
7
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is evident in the principal case.12 An income tax must be paid on income received
after decedent dies, and if the same income were also taxed as part of the gross
estate, double taxation would result and in the case of large estates would leave a
smaller estate for distribution than if no income had been earned.18 This result
would not seem to be consistent with the purpose of the act.u Although the
Court seems to have arrived at the most reasonable interpretation of the act, the
question still remains whether it is wise judicial policy for the Court to interfere
in such decisions of administrative boards when the interpretation given the
statute is a reasonably possible one even if not the best interpretation.15 Since the
Tr~asury regulation would not carry out the purposes of the statute, since the
wording of the statute and intent of the Congress seems clear, and since the
interpretation given by the Treasury regulation would result in undue hardship
in some instances, it seems that this is a proper case for the Court to set aside the
administrative interpretation.
lay W. Sorge

312 U.S. at 449.
See Hughes, "Validity of Estate Tax Regulations So," 17 TAXES 145 (1939).
14 See note 3, supra.
15 Justices Black and Douglas in their dissent in the principal case felt that this
matter of statutory construction could best be handled by administrative interpretation,
and for this reason the Court should not interfere. In Securities Allied Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 384, cert. den. 305
U.S. 617, 59 S. Ct. 76 (1938), the court held that the regulation does not have to be
the best of all possible interpretations. See PAuL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 3d
series, 422-42 5 ( I 940), where the author says that since framers of the regulations
often aid in drafting tax laws their interpretation may often be that which Congress
intended.
12
18

